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BODY, MIND, SOUL:
AN EDUCATIONAL INTERPRETATION
BY H. G. TOWNSEND
THOSE who formulated the main outlines of the theory of a
liberal education may hardly be said to have made a distinction
between the mind and the body. The distinction with which we are
familiar today was really made by modern philosophical writers.
As it was formulated by the philosopher Descartes in the first half
of the seventeenth century it was somewhat as follows : There are
two ultimate and indestructible realities or substances in the world
—res extensa and res cogitans. These two are separate and distinct
except in the case of man where the two are combined through the
curious mechanism of the brain and especially through the pineal
gland which, he said, served as a fulcrum over which the mind could
be brought into effective control of the body. This is substantially
the popular view held today of the way the mind and the body are
related. However unsatisfactory this view may appear at first
glance, we would not be wise in rejecting it until we examine it quite
closely.
The very first question to be answered is, What is our knowledge
of substances ? I hold a ball in my hand ; I know how it looks ; how
it feels and what it does under given conditions. I say of the ball,
it is round, it is made of rubber, it will bounce, it will decay, it will
burn, and when it burns it will give off a pungent and offensive
odor. In fact, I can make an indefinite number of verifiable state-
ments about the ball without being in the least able otherwise to
define the "it" with which all the statements begin. The ball itself
is beyond the reach of my senses. The best evidence I have of its
reality, probably the only evidence is an inference to the effect that
so many characters require something to bind them together into
the form of a unit. If the ball is black and round I am led to believe
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that these two quahties are stuck together by some sort of cement.
If I make one of the qualities modify the other—i. e., black round-
ness—the total effect is to attribute a more substantial existence to
the roundness than I do to the blackness. This example will serve
to illustrate the principle that a substance is a logical device for
expressing relations which we discover in our experience. This
seems to be all that we can know about a substance.
If this is the proper definition of substance we shall see that there
is no reason to suppose that there are just two substances, no more
and no less. To the substances that occupy space we might at least
add those that occupy time. We affirm the same substantive rela-
tion if we say of truth that it is relative or of substance itself that it
is a logical device. The use of the Latin word res and the corre-
sponding English word "thing" is likely to give a false appearance
of simplicity when we say. There are extended things, and thinking
things. Without being fully aware of it we tend to set one up beside
the other as though they were equally objects of vision and there-
fore we think we have made a clearer distinction than we have.
There seems to be no reason for denying that a "thing" may be
both extended and thinking. We may certainly affirm that a "thing"
is neither ; as when we declare that truth will prevail. Truth has
the same substantive value in such a proposition as res extensa has
in the statement, the ball is round. Is it not, therefore, likely to
mislead us in thinking about the bodv and the mind to start out with
a distinction which cannot be defended? The number of substances
would have to be as great as the possible number of statements which
we could make about our experience.
But if for the sake of the argument we should agree that there
are just two substances, there are enough questions still remaining
to plague us before we can think clearly about the bodv and the
mind. Such is the question, for instance, as to the method of inter-
action. How does the mind act upon the bodv? Which caused the
other ^ How were they both caused? These are the questions about
which have raged many battles royal. The bare statement that there
are just two substances bristles Avith insoluble problems. For the
sake of illustration we may cite some of the answers to the above
questions.
The first question. How does the mind act upon the body? was
asked and answered by Descartes. His answer was that although
the mind could have no effect on the gross forms of matter directly
it could be supposed to move the refined matter of the pineal gland
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and then in turn through many stages to put in motion the human
body and finally other bodies. As for the animals, he supposed that
they were mere automatic mechanical adaptations of matter. By an
analogous reasoning the influence of matter upon mind is proposed
as the cause of thinking. Thus Thomas Hobbes and many others
have advanced the theory that motion in the external world is trans-
mitted directly through the nerves to the brain and, becoming finer
and finer, it somehow leaps the gap that separates body from mind
and presto body acts upon the mind. The fallacy involved in such
reasoning seems to be that we start out with a distinction which can-
not be maintained to the end and therefore we gradually put back
into the magic hat what we had suddenly removed. The result
sooner or later is to conclude that mind is after all only a form of
body or thai body is only a form of mind.
Is the body the cause of the mind or is the mind the cause of
the body? This question is not essentially dififerent from the first one.
It merely extends the field of inquiry from the individual to the gen-
eral cosmic relation of mind and matter. The answer to this ques-
tion, like the question itself, does not differ materially from its pre-
decessor. It makes the same unwarranted separation between mind
and matter. It supposes that they are distinct and independent sub-
stances and then vainly attempts to establish a causal relation be-
tween them. The total eflfect is to reduce one to the terms of the
other. This is altogether a futile thing to do, as it brings us back
to the very point from which we started the argument.
At this point many would be ready to abandon the entire problem
of the relation between the mind and the body and to say that it is
of no concern to the teacher in any case. This will not do, for
sooner or later every serious theory of education must give an ac-
count of some kind of the relation between the mind and the body.
It is the particular answer in terms of substance that must be aban-
doned. The experience of every day shows us that some kind of
motion in the outside world stimulates a nerve and if we are to
believe the neurologist the motion is transmitted by the nerve to other
nerves and rerve centers. This motion may go on as far as you care
to suppose ; but as long as it remains motion in the accepted sense
of the word it is not an idea. The supposition that motion by becom-
ing finer and finer can gradually be transformed into the idea of
motion is much like the supposition that persistent vertical extension
may some day yield a horizontal line. The two may be and prob-
ably are related without being in any way reducible one to the other.
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A more hopeful attempt at defining the relation of mind and
body will abandon the assumption that they must be related either as
objects juxtaposed in space or as a father is related to the son. If
a fig-ure of speech is desired to embody the relation we might say
that mind is related to the body as the meaning of a word is related
to the printed or spoken symbols of that meaning. While no figure
of speech ir entirely adequate this one at least avoids the fantasy
of trying to reduce the world to just two or any given number of
substances. It does not cut the world up into fragments and then
lament its inability to get it put together again. If we study the
relation expressed in this figure of speech we may discover its
usefulness in a theory of education.
The first characteristic of the relation of meaning and symbol is
that it is indissoluble. As far as education is concerned, mind and
body are also indissoluble. The teacher does not and could not pre-
tend to be dealing with one to the exclusion of the other. The com-
munication of meaning is mediated by symbols and the symbols in
turn demand meaning for their very existence. The teacher uses
the body to reach and perhaps to create the mind as the writer uses
words and other symbols to embody meaning.
In the second place the relation between mind and body is like
the relation between meaning and symbol in that it is variable. The
substance philosophies do not satisfy this test. The simplest expe-
rience of life reveals its fluid or dynamic character to such an extent
that we somehow feel the grotesqueness of treating mind as a static
thing. Meaning plays about the symbol as light plays about the open
fire, it moves, turns this way and that, retreats and thrusts itself
out in some new place. This is a better description of the mind
than to call it merely res cogitans. The teacher not only recognizes
the veracity of such a description but has a fair starting point from
which to plan and exequte modifications of mind. Mind is mediated
by body as meaning is mediated by symbols. Teaching becomes an
art like the art of writing or painting.
In the third place our figure of speech is useful because it makes
intelligible the degrees of worth or value which we attach to the
various phases of our experience. Without denying or seeming to
deny the permanent necessity of body we may yet hold to the supe-
rior worth of the mind. We do not hesitate to say that the symbol
exists for the sake of the meaning. The meaning is an end toward
w^hich the symbol is a means and we cannot by any twist of the
imagination reverse the relation. This is in keeping with the all but
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universal testimony of men in all generations. The savage and the
civilized, the oriental and the occidental, the Greek and the bar-
barian, the learned and the ignorant attach some superior value to
mind.
Finally, this theory of the relation of mind and body will not
permit us to mistreat or despise the body for the sake of the mind.
A perfect meaning is conveyed only by a perfect symbol. It must,
therefore, be the highest duty of the teacher to secure a sound mind
in a sound body. This is the result although not the exact process
by which the Greek philosophers defined the aim of education. Hav-
ing made no sharp separation between knowledge and virtue, theory
and practice, mind and body, they were not embarrassed by the dis-
torted conceptions of the aim of education that characterized some
other epochs in our history. Such a theory gives no countenance
to sensualism on the one hand or to the flattery of martyrdom on
the other. The sensual man is he who blindly serves the body ; the
arrogant martyr is he who seeks to get the meaning without the
mediation of the svmbol.
Wherever man has left a record of his thoughts either in the
form of written language or in the more primitive pictures which
he made on the walls of caves and tombs, he has revealed his inter-
est in the soul. It has been supposed that the idea of the soul origi-
nated in m^n's desire to find an unchanging and abiding reality amid
the stress and danger of life. This theory supposes that the soul
exists only in the imagination of ignorant men who give a name to
their ignorance. Lying down to sleep they dream of other scenes
and when they awake they declare that some vital part of themselves
has been abroad during the night. When they see the phenomena
of death they infer that something leaves the body. They dream of
those who have died and infer an existence in some realm apart
from the decaying body. Some ancient peqple identified the soul
with the breath ; others found its seat in the heart, or the kidneys or
some other recess of the body. These crude figures of speech are
often cited as further evidence that the soul is a myth. By the same
method of reasoning we might show that the mind is a myth or that
any other intangible is a myth.
But for the teacher it is far more important to examine the mean-
ing content of the idea of the soul than it is to speculate about
its origin ; for the idea of the soul is at the heart of any theory of
value ; and education above everything else in the world must have
a theory of value. Without a theory of value the whole edifice of
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educational practice would tumble into ruins. We have already
made a beginning on a theory of value in the discussion of the rela-
tion of mind and matter. We have seen that there is pretty gen-
eral agreement that the mind is of more worth than the body. Never-
theless, if we follow the theory of the Greeks, we cannot hold the
body in contempt because it is through the body that the mind
realizes itself. We must examine the conception of value a little
more closely. It may be possible to locate it still more exactly in
that which men call the soul.
When we say that a man or a thing has a soul we call attention
to the fact that the distinguishable parts which go to make up the
whole are of unequal worth. The word soul is a symbol of the
otherwise unnamed part which ranks above them all. the very center
and core of being. The judgment that a man has a good soul seems
to mean that notwithstanding faults and imperfections which all
may recognize and deplore there is in him that which commands
our praise and respect. It means that we can overlook much that
is superficial, and penetrate to that which is more important.
If we try to define the most valuable thing in the world we
must be prepared to define it in terms of our own life experience.
From time to time some one tells us that if we would be strictly
scientific we must detach ourseh'es from human interests and bias
and for the sake of truth measure the world with the mind of a fish
or an amoeba. This is little better than nonsense or at best a mag-
nificent gesture. When we imagine what a fish desires we imagine
what we desire. For example, we often say to a child. "I should
not do that if I were you," when greater accuracy would make us
say, "You would not do that if you were I." The barrier that
separates us from the child is slight when compared with the bar-
rier that separates us from the fish. Rebel against it as we may,
our judgments of worth are human judgments and are born in
human experience.
Probably no definition of value has ever been suggested which
did not rest upon a conception of human desire either, expressed
or implied. The inarticulate child crying for the moon, the gour-
met scanning the menu card, the anchorite in his cell, the politician,
the scholar, the sailor and the rest of the human race are seeking to
satisfy some desire. In such a confusion and conflict of desires,
however, one may well hesitate before making an attempt to find a
common feature. For this reason many have contended that there
is no supreme desire and consequently no supreme value in life.
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Such a contention is the expression of a mind too tired or too timid
to undertake the arduous task of thinking through the syllogism
of experience. No honest teacher can adopt such a theory of value
for it leaves all our judgments without significance and the enter-
prise of education becomes a silly farce: "Pushpin is as good as
poetry" ; crying for the moon as worthy an undertaking as the devel-
opment of astronomy. Moreover, those who hold to such a view
are so profoundly impressed by the conflict of desires that they are
blind to rhe equally obvious fact that each man adopts some scale
of values as a working hypothesis in the organization of his own
experience. He prefers one form of life or another even in spite
of protests that pushpin is as good as poetry. The phrase itself
is in a state of unstable equilibrium and sooner or later finds its
full expression in the form "pushpin is better than poetry." The
rejection of a scale of values is a theory which breaks down of its
own inherent weakness whenever it is carefully scrutinized.
Amid the conflicting desires and experiences of a human life
the discovery of the supreme value is largely empirical. No a priori
argument for this or that satisfaction can take the place in the indi-
vidual's life of patient analysis at each stage of growth. Neverthe-
less, the condensed experience of the race as found in history, liter-
ature and philosophy draws the main outlines of a scale of values.
Without this condensed experience, commonly called our social in-
heritance, the struggle of the individual to chart a safe course would
be extremely painful and hazardous. As it is, he who runs may
read that there are some satisfactions of desire which men have
found richer, fuller and more enduring than others. If there is
uncertainty and confusion in the condensed experience of men it is
slight when compared with the blind groping of the solitary individ-
ual after some principle of organization within his own flood of
desire.
If the preceding argument is fundamentally sound it seems to
follow that a definition of the soul must be written in terms of the
organization of experience in relation to a supreme value. Perhaps
the follow. ng definition may be useful in grasping the true signifi-
cance of man's perennial interest in the soul : the soul is the living
organizatioii of symbol and meaning achieved by the individual
through an intelligent participation in the sfeneralized desires of man-
kind. As the mind seems by common consent to be of greater value
man the body, '•o the soul transcends them both because it is the
spiritualized relation of mind and body through the divine function
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of activilv. Such a definition need not be interpreted in such a
•»vay as to cliny : soul to the meanest creature because symbol and
meaning are ne\'er separable at any stage of development. Matter
untouched by organization is a figment of the imagination. It is not
therefore a case of the presence or absence of organization but
rather a case of more or less. The definition would seem, however,
to exclude the possibility of attributing a soul to all things at random
as if it were a commodity to be handed about or parcelled out and
kept in one's possession. If the soul is to have any meaning in an
educational context it must be thought of not as a thing but rather
as a process. If the soul is to be understood in terms of value it
demands the function of critical intelligence for its very being.
\^alue as we have argued is of or pertaining to persons because it de-
mands the exercise of judgment. Probably the key to th puzzle
may be discovered in a proper distinction between organization for
experience and organization of experience. It is to the latter only
that value seems to pertain. It is a fruitless quest to seek a point
in the scale of existence below which there is no soul. Such a search
is destined to fail precisely because it postulates a fixed relation
within a system which gets its entire definition by its relation to a
point outside of itself. That is to say, value and the soul are attrib-
ues of experience and not single points within that experience. We
can only say that wherever principles of organization are at work
there is the realm of value.
As a corollary to the preceding argument it seems to follow that
value in some sense is independent of the temporal order. It neither
is to be found at a point in space nor at a point in time. Value is
rather the significant organization of sequence than any moment in
such a system. If we conclude that the soul is a principle of organi-
zation we have already introduced a theory of immortality, but for
the purposes of education it is unnecessary to develop that theory.
It is enough to point to the fact that human experience is organized
in terms of intelligibility and value—that the idea of the soul is the
postulate of the supreme value—and that education has to do with
the achievement of this supreme value.
The task of education clearly emerges at this point in the dis-
cussion. It is none other than the task of organization—the task
at once the most intimate and the most universal of human expe-
rience.
